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Product Liability’s Parallel Universe
FAULT-BASED LIABILITY THEORIES AND MODERN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Richard C. Ausness†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Strict liability has always been the heart and soul of American
products liability law. As early as 1963, Justice Roger Traynor in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.1 stated that “[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it will be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being.”2 Shortly thereafter, the drafters of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts made it clear that the
exercise of due care would not shield sellers from liability when their
products caused injury.3 The new Products Liability Restatement
continues to adhere to the concept of strict liability, at least in theory.4
Nevertheless, plaintiffs now commonly supplement or even replace strict
liability with claims that rely on fault-based liability theories. These
theories are attractive because they allow plaintiffs to avoid the
Restatement’s defect requirement and enable them to focus on a product
seller’s behavior instead of the condition of its product.
Part II examines some of these theories, including fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy, negligent
entrustment, negligent marketing, and negligence per se. Part III
identifies some of the reasons why plaintiffs prefer fault-based liability
theories instead of strict liability: these theories enable them to avoid the
product defect requirement, to circumvent the preemptive effect of
federal law on certain failure to warn claims, and to focus the jury’s
attention on the defendant’s culpable misconduct. In addition, these
theories allow plaintiffs to side-step risk-utility analysis in design defect
cases and relieve them of the need to prove the existence of a reasonable
alternative design. Theories such as fraud and negligent marketing may
†

William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, and J.D.,
1968, University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
2
Id. at 900.
3
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(a) (1965).
4
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998).
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prove useful in obvious hazard situations. Fault-based liability theories
are also useful in suits against drug companies because they help
plaintiffs to avoid the Restatement’s special rules, which limit
conventional design defect and failure to warn claims against
manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices.5
Part IV concludes by predicting that strict liability will continue
to lose ground in products liability law, except in manufacturing defect
cases, because of the advantages that plaintiffs see in fault-based liability
theories. While this trend may be beneficial because it helps to reorient
products liability law toward a conduct-based liability regime, it also
encourages litigants to expand existing liability doctrines beyond their
traditional boundaries. Hence, courts must be wary of embracing extreme
versions of these theories.
II.

FAULT-BASED LIABILITY THEORIES

Injured consumers who are unlikely to be successful under
traditional strict liability now rely on a variety of other liability theories
to improve their chances of recovering. These theories include fraudulent
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy,
negligent entrustment, negligent marketing, and negligence per se.
Although some of these theories, such as misrepresentation and civil
conspiracy, are subject to onerous requirements, and others, such as
negligent entrustment and negligent marketing, have not completely
gained judicial acceptance, it nevertheless appears that plaintiffs continue
to invoke them in products liability litigation.
A.

Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Concealment

Courts commonly classify fraud as either fraudulent misrepresentation
or fraudulent concealment. “Fraudulent misrepresentation is defined as the
false statement of a material fact made to induce another party to act in
reliance thereon and resulting in damage to the party who so relies.”6 In
order to establish a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the
plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant made a false representation of
a material fact; (2) that the defendant was aware that the statement was
false; (3) that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely on this
false statement; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm as a result of his
or her justifiable reliance on the defendant’s false statement.7 In addition,
the elements of a fraud claim must be pleaded with particularity.8
5

See id. § 6.
See People ex rel. Hartigan v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 607 N.E.2d 165 (Ill. 1992).
7
See, e.g., Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 2003)
(listing requirements); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (same),
aff’d, 521 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9. 2009);
6
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These requirements are often difficult for plaintiffs to meet. For
example, to satisfy the false statement requirement, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant made a false representation of material fact, as
opposed to merely expressing an opinion or engaging in “sales talk.”9
This caused the court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ fraudulent
misrepresentation claim in Boumelhem v. Bic Corp.10 The plaintiffs were
two young children who were injured when the older boy used a
disposable lighter manufactured by the defendant to start a fire.11 The
plaintiffs argued that various marketing techniques, such as the slogan
“Flick My Bic,” the schoolboy logo on the lighter’s packaging, or the
pastel colors of the lighters amounted to a representation that these
products were safe for children.12 Affirming the lower court’s ruling in
favor of the defendant, a Michigan intermediate appellate court
concluded that the defendant had made no assurances that its lighters
could not be used by children to start fires.13
The estate of a deceased smoker fared somewhat better in Estate
of Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc.14 In that case, the decedent’s personal
representative alleged that the defendant made a number of false
representations about the health effects of smoking, namely that no
causal link between smoking and lung cancer had been established, that
cigarettes were not addictive, and that “low tar” cigarettes were safer
than regular cigarettes.15 On appeal, an Oregon court observed that a
defendant who made a promise knowing that it would not be performed
was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.16 The court found that the
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find that
the defendant knew during this period that tobacco smoke was
carcinogenic, that nicotine was addictive, and that nicotine addiction was
Gerrity v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 399 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D. Conn. 2005) (same); Jeter ex rel.
Estate of Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(same); Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (same);
Staudt v. Artifex, Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (same); Mason v. Chrysler
Corp., 653 So. 2d 951, 952 (Ala. 1995) (same); Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Ct.
App. 1990) (same); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869, 876 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003)
(same); Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (same);
Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 844-45 (Neb. 2000) (same); Estate of
Schwarz v. Philip Morris, Inc., 135 P.3d 409, 422 (Or. 2006) (same).
8
See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783-84 (4th Cir.
1999); Roney v. Gencorp, 431 F. Supp. 2d 622, 635 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); Wajda v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32-33 (D. Mass. 2000); Bd. of Educ. of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc.,
546 N.E.2d 580, 593 (Ill. 1989).
9
See Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So. 2d 951, 954 (Ala. 1995); McGowan v. Chrysler
Corp., 631 So. 2d 842, 847 (Ala. 1993); Boumelhem v. Bic Corp., 535 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995).
10
535 N.W.2d 574 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
11
Id. at 576.
12
Id. at 579.
13
Id.
14
135 P.3d 409 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
15
Id. at 416.
16
Id. at 422.
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the principal reason that smokers continued to smoke.17 Instead of
making this research public, as it had pledged to do, the “defendant
publicly denied” that there was any link between smoking and cancer
and “suppressed the results of its [own] research.”18 From this evidence,
the court concluded that the defendant promised to conduct research on
the health effects of smoking and to promptly and fully disclose the
results of this research to the public, but, in fact, had no intention of
carrying these promises out.19 Consequently, the court upheld the
deceased smoker’s fraud claim.20
Reliance is another essential element of any fraudulent
misrepresentation claim.21 This element is often difficult for a plaintiff to
prove. However, as Roney v. Gencorp22 illustrates, proving reliance is not
an insurmountable burden. In Roney, the plaintiff died from liver cancer
as the result of exposure at his workplace to vapor, steam, and fumes
containing vinyl chloride monomer (VCM).23 Roney’s personal
representative brought suit against various manufacturers and suppliers
of VCM, alleging that they fraudulently misrepresented and concealed
the dangers of exposure to this chemical.24 According to the plaintiff, the
defendants supplied the decedent’s employer with a publication, DS-56,
that contained the fraudulent statements.25 The plaintiff in Roney had
specifically alleged that the fraudulent misrepresentations contained in
DS-56 were communicated to the decedent by his employer.26 In fact, the
plaintiffs claimed that the decedent’s employer gave him a copy of DS56 and that the decedent relied upon the information contained in that
document.27 For this reason, the court in Roney refused to dismiss the
plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim on grounds of lack of
reliance.28
17

Id. at 418.
Id.
19
Id. at 423.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Jeter ex rel. Estate of Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 681, 687 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1293
(M.D. Ala. 2001); Wajda v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D. Mass. 2000);
Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (E.D. Ark. 1999); Berres
v. Artifex, Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Staudt v. Artifex, Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1030-31 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869, 876 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003); Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 437 (Tex. 1997); see also John C.P.
Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1001, 1004 (2006).
22
431 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); see also Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc.,
576 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the plaintiff alleged reliance
sufficiently in the pleadings to satisfy the reliance requirement).
23
431 F. Supp. 2d at 626-27.
24
Id. at 634.
25
Id. at 636.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 637.
18
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Fraudulent concealment involves the concealment of material
facts by one who has knowledge of these facts and a duty to disclose
when the purpose of this concealment is to mislead or defraud the
plaintiff.29 Most fraudulent concealment cases involve either a duty to
disclose or the reliance requirement. When fraudulent concealment
merely involves a failure to disclose information, as opposed to active
concealment, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty to
disclose the facts in question.30 For example, in Estate of White ex rel.
White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,31 the court declared that fraudulent
concealment required the existence of “a separate duty of disclosure to
plaintiff by defendant.”32 According to the court, this duty to disclose
would arise when the parties were in a fiduciary or confidential
relationship with each other or when one party made a partial or
incomplete statement of fact.33 The court concluded that “the arms-length
relationship between [the] defendant cigarette manufacturers” and the
decedent smoker was not the sort of “special relationship” that would
create a duty on the part of the defendants to divulge information to
consumers about the dangers of smoking.34
On the other hand, in the Roney case, the court refused to dismiss
the plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim against the defendant
chemical supplier.35 As noted, the plaintiff in that case alleged, inter alia,
that the defendant had concealed information about the danger of
workplace exposure to its product, VCM.36 The court held that the
manufacturer had a common law duty to warn and its breach of that duty
was sufficient to support a claim for fraudulent concealment.37 A court
employed similar reasoning in Falk v. General Motors Corp.38 In Falk,
the plaintiffs claimed that General Motors placed defective speedometers
in some of its trucks and sports utility vehicles and failed to disclose this
information to consumers once it became aware of it.39 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs stated a claim for fraudulent concealment by
alleging sufficient facts to establish that General Motors had a duty to
warn purchasers of its products about the defective speedometers, a
29

See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 521
F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9. 2009); Roney, 431 F.
Supp. 2d at 637; Livingstone v. K-Mart Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (S.D. W. Va. 1998); Mason
v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So. 2d 951, 954 (Ala. 1995).
30
See, e.g., Estate of White ex. rel. White v. R.J. Reynold Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d
424, 430 (D. Md. 2000); Chavers v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 203 (Ct. App. 2003);
Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
31
109 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. Md. 2000).
32
Id. at 430 (internal citations omitted).
33
Id. at 431.
34
Id.
35
431 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D. W. Va. 2006).
36
Id. at 637.
37
Id.
38
496 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
39
Id. at 1092-93.

640

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

potential safety hazard, and instead withheld this information from
them.40
The false representation and reliance requirements sometimes
prevent plaintiffs from recovering in fraudulent misrepresentation
cases.41 However, others, particularly injured smokers, have been
successful in bringing fraudulent misrepresentation claims against
product manufacturers.42 Likewise, the reliance requirement and the duty
to disclose requirement have thwarted a number of fraudulent
concealment claims, but some plaintiffs have overcome and prevailed, at
least in the early stages of litigation.
B.

Civil Conspiracy

A civil conspiracy exists when two or more persons engage in
concerted action to achieve some unlawful objective (or to achieve a
lawful objective by unlawful means).43 Thus, the plaintiff in a civil
conspiracy case must prove: (1) the existence of an agreement to commit
an unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means; (2) the
commission of an overt act or independent tort for the purpose of
furthering the objectives of the conspiracy; and (3) damage to another
caused by the conspiracy.44 These can be formidable requirements for
plaintiffs in products liability cases.
For there to be a civil conspiracy, two or more persons must
agree to commit a wrongful act.45 Thus, a person who is merely aware
that others are engaged in a conspiracy46 or becomes involved in one
inadvertently, accidentally, or even negligently47 will not be subject to
liability for civil conspiracy. Furthermore, as illustrated by Cousineau v.

40

Id. at 1099.
See Jeter ex rel. Estate of Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F. Supp.
2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (finding no proof of reliance); Boumelhem v. Bic Corp., 535 N.W.2d
574, 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the defendant had not made any false representations).
42
See, e.g., supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
43
See LaBelle ex rel. LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 526 (D.S.C.
2001); In re N.D. Personal Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 (D.N.D. 1990);
Belkow v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,
Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 141 N.W.2d
36, 48 (Mich. 1966); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169, 174 (Pa. 1997); Triplex
Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. 1995).
44
See Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171 (E.D.
Ark. 1999); Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Nicolet, Inc.,
v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149-50 (Del. 1987); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H.
1987).
45
See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
634 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981); Wright v.
Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 172 (Iowa 2002).
46
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965) (requiring that the actor provide
assistance or encouragement to the conspirators).
47
See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
41
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Ford Motor Co.,48 the agreement between the conspirators must involve
an objective that is tortious or unlawful.49 In Cousineau, the plaintiff’s
son was killed when a multi-rim truck wheel flew apart as he was
removing it to repair the tire on his employer’s truck.50 Because the
plaintiff was unable to identify the manufacturer of the truck wheel in
question, she sued all of the manufacturers of multi-rim truck wheels,
alleging that they conspired to make product identification more
difficult.51 However, a Michigan appeals court held that the plaintiff’s
claim failed because she was unable to prove that the alleged industrywide agreement was unlawful.52
On the other hand, the plaintiffs in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation successfully demonstrated
that the agreement in question was unlawful.53 In that class action suit,
the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturers of MTBE, a gasoline
additive, formed a number of joint task forces and committees for the
express purpose of suppressing information about MTBE’s
environmental and health hazards.54 The plaintiffs also accused the
defendant manufacturers of conspiring to deceive government regulators
and the public about these hazards.55 The court held that these charges, if
proven, would support the plaintiffs’ assertion that the defendants had
entered into an unlawful agreement.56
The plaintiff must also show that the defendants have actually
committed an “overt act” or “independent tort.”57 Although this
requirement potentially includes a wide range of wrongful conduct, the
overt acts alleged against the defendants in products liability cases have
usually been either fraudulent misrepresentation58 or fraudulent
concealment.59 In cases where the overt act alleged is fraudulent
misrepresentation, plaintiffs have sometimes had difficulty satisfying the

48

363 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 730-31.
50
Id. at 725.
51
Id. at 731.
52
Id.
53
175 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
54
Id. at 634.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 635.
57
See Roney v. Gencorp, 431 F. Supp. 2d 622, 637 (S.D. W. Va. 2006); Hays v. Bankers
Trust Co. of Cal., 46 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497 (S.D. W. Va. 1999).
58
See, e.g., Taylor v. Airco, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 432, 445-47 (D. Mass. 2007); Johnson
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 207-08 (D. Mass. 2000); Estate of
White ex rel. White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D. Md. 2000); Ryan v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981); Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 732
N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (App. Div. 2001).
59
See, e.g., Estate of White, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Chavers v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 198, 203 (Ct. App. 2003); Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1987); In re Fifth
Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 784 N.Y.S.2d 829, 833 (Sup. Ct. 2004); Viguers v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
49
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reliance requirement.60 Plaintiffs have also relied on fraudulent
concealment to satisfy the overt act in civil conspiracy cases. Thus, a
court allowed the plaintiffs in Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt61 to show that the
defendant participated in a conspiracy to conceal information about the
health risks of exposure to asbestos.62 The court concluded that a
defendant who “actively conceal[ed] a material fact” would be guilty of
fraudulent concealment regardless of whether there was a duty to speak.63
Consequently, the court held that the plaintiffs could recover under a
theory of civil conspiracy if they could prove that the defendant was
involved in a conspiracy whose participants actively concealed
information about the risks of asbestos.64
Despite its burdensome requirements, civil conspiracy is a useful
theory for plaintiffs because it allows them to sue multiple parties and
also enables them to show that an entire industry has acted wrongfully.65
The imposition of large punitive damage awards in such cases suggests
that juries have responded with outrage when plaintiffs presented
evidence of concerted action by asbestos and tobacco companies to
withhold information from consumers about the health risks associated
with their products.66
C.

Negligent Entrustment

The doctrine of negligent entrustment ordinarily imposes
liability on the owners of dangerous chattels, such as motor vehicles or
firearms, when they knowingly place these objects in the hands of
incompetent persons who harm themselves or others.67 The defendant’s
duty of care arises from the fact that he or she has the ability to
determine who may use the chattel.68 Consequently, the negligent
entrustment doctrine is not usually applicable to negligent acts that occur
60

See, e.g., Taylor v. Airco, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 432, 447 (D. Mass. 2007); Estate of
White, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 428-30.
61
525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
62
Id. at 150.
63
Id. at 149.
64
Id. at 150.
65
See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 47 (Tex. 1998).
66
See, e.g., Garza v. Asbestos Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 359 (Ct. App. 2008) ($10 million
punitive damage award); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638 (Ct. App. 2005) ($3
billion award reduced to $50 million on appeal); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972
S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) ($3.7 million punitive damage award upheld); see also DAVID G. OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.2 at 1184 (2d ed. 2008).
67
See, e.g., Ireland v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dept., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1229 (D.
Colo. 2002); Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 729, 734 (W.D. Tenn. 1997); Kitchen v.
K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1997); McBerry v. Ivie, 159 S.E.2d 108, 111 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1967); Leone v. Doran, 292 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1973); Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 389
(N.J. 1960); Mazzilli v. Selger, 99 A.2d 417, 421 (N.J. 1953); LaFaso v. LaFaso, 223 A.2d 814, 819
(Vt. 1966).
68
See Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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after possession or control has passed to the transferee.69 However, some
courts have expanded the doctrine of negligent entrustment and applied it
to cases where a defendant who has never had legal possession or control
over the chattel assisted or enabled an unsuitable person to acquire
possession or control over it.70 For example, a number of courts have
applied the negligent entrustment doctrine to impose liability on parents
who donated or purchased automobiles for the use of their reckless or
incompetent children.71
Recently, plaintiffs have tried to expand the concept of negligent
entrustment even further by seeking to impose liability on manufacturers
who sell or facilitate the sale of dangerous products to minors and other
unsuitable persons.72 So far, these efforts have largely failed.73 A leading
example of this is Kyte v. Philip Morris, Inc.,74 where the plaintiffs tried
to apply the concept of negligent entrustment to a cigarette manufacturer.
The plaintiffs in that case were teenagers who suffered various injuries,
including nicotine addiction, as the result of smoking cigarettes
manufactured by the defendant, Philip Morris.75 They alleged that they
purchased cigarettes at various convenience stores in the area despite the
fact that state law prohibited the sale of tobacco products to minors.76
According to the plaintiffs, Philip Morris was guilty of negligent
entrustment because it introduced cigarettes into the stream of
commerce, knowing that retailers routinely sold cigarettes to minors in
violation of the law.77 The lower court denied the manufacturer’s motion
for summary judgment.78
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that
Massachusetts recognized the validity of the negligent entrustment
doctrine in its traditional form, but the court refused to extend liability to
a manufacturer solely because its products might be dangerous when
purchased by certain individuals.79 Furthermore, the court ruled that since
the defendant did not sell cigarettes directly to minors, it could only be
held liable for their injuries if there were some sort of agreement between

69

See Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 606-07 (Ky. 1953); Sikora v. Wade, 342 A.2d
580, 582 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).
70
See Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 106 (Vt. 1989).
71
See, e.g., McCart v. Muir, 641 P.2d 384, 388 (Kan. 1982); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein,
431 A.2d 76, 81 (Md. 1981); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 106 (Vt. 1989).
72
See Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 689 (1998).
73
See Kyte v. Philip Morris, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (Mass. 1990); Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1064 (N.Y. 2001); Earsing v. Nelson, 629 N.Y.S. 2d 563,
565 (App. Div. 1995).
74
556 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1990).
75
Id. at 1026.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1027.
79
Id. at 1029.
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it and its retailers to engage in such sales.80 In the absence of such an
agreement, the fact that retailers engaged in a pattern of selling cigarettes
to minors was not enough to hold the manufacturer liable under a theory
of negligent entrustment.81
A New York intermediate appellate court also refused to apply
the doctrine of negligent entrustment to a product manufacturer. In
Earsing v. Nelson,82 a teenaged boy who was hit by a BB pellet from a
gun sued the manufacturer of the gun and the retail seller, alleging, inter
alia, negligent entrustment.83 The retailer had sold the BB gun to a
thirteen-year-old who gave it to a seventeen-year-old friend for
safekeeping.84 The friend accidentally shot the plaintiff, not knowing that
the gun was loaded at the time of the accident.85 The trial court allowed
the negligent entrustment claim against the retailer to stand but dismissed
the claim against the manufacturer.86 On appeal, the higher court noted
that “[t]he tort of negligent entrustment is based on the degree of
knowledge the supplier of a chattel had or should have concerning the
entrustee’s propensity to use the chattel in an improper or dangerous
fashion.”87 Unlike the retail seller, the BB gun manufacturer had no direct
involvement in the sale and could not have known that the purchaser of
the gun in question was only thirteen years old.88 Accordingly, the court
upheld the trial court’s decision.89
Obviously, it would be a huge boon to injured consumers if
courts were to recognize the expanded version of negligent entrustment
proposed by the plaintiffs in Kyte and Earsing. This form of negligent
entrustment would be especially effective against manufacturers of
inherently dangerous products such as handguns and cigarettes. Although
courts have so far refused to extend negligent entrustment beyond its
traditional boundaries, plaintiffs will no doubt continue to push for a
change in the law.
D.

Negligent Marketing

The theory of negligent marketing requires sellers to market their
products in a manner that will not increase the products’ inherent risks to
consumers or third parties.90 There are three categories of negligent
80
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marketing claims: “(1) product designs that make the product more
attractive to criminals; (2) advertising and promotional activities that
target inappropriate users; and (3) product distribution practices that
[encourage or] facilitate retail sales of dangerous products to vulnerable
or unsuitable users.”91
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.92 provides a good example of a negligent
marketing claim based on product design. Navegar, the defendant,
manufactured two types of semiautomatic assault weapons, the TEC-9
and the TEC-DC9.93 A man named Gian Ferri used several of the
defendant’s products to kill eight persons and wound six others before
killing himself.94 Although Ferri purchased the weapons from licensed
gun dealers in a nearby state, the plaintiffs argued that the manufacturer
should be held civilly liable because the weapons were designed to
appeal to those who were likely to use them to commit criminal acts.95
For example, the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 were designed to accept largecapacity fifty-round magazines and were equipped with “barrel
shroud[s],” which allowed the user to spray his fire.96 In addition, the
barrels were threaded to enable the user to attach a silencer or flash
suppressor to the weapon.97 Furthermore, the weapons were fitted with a
sling device that allowed them to be fired rapidly from the hip.98 Finally,
the TEC-DC9s were compact and capable of being broken down for easy
concealment, and they were compatible with a “Hell Fire” trigger
mechanism, which enabled them to be fired at a faster rate than a normal
semiautomatic weapon.99 A TEC-DC9 so equipped could be easily
modified to fire like a fully automatic submachine gun.100 In spite of this,
the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, finding that they had failed to establish
that Navegar had any duty to protect them against the criminal actions of
Mr. Ferri.101
On appeal, a California intermediate appellate court focused on
duty and causation.102 In its analysis of the duty issue, the court
acknowledged that the manufacturer of a non-defective product is not
liable for merely placing it in the market.103 However, the court declared
91
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that the defendant could be liable if it increased the risk of an activity
beyond its inherent risks.104 The court then considered a number of
factors that might give rise to a duty to refrain from affirmatively
increasing the risk of marketing firearms. These factors included the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the public interest in preventing
future harm, and the burden that imposing a duty would have on the
defendant and the community.105
Addressing the foreseeability issue, the court in Merrill stated
that criminal acts, such as those committed by Ferri, were foreseeable, in
part because many of the TEC-DC9’s features were designed to appeal to
criminal users.106 Turning to the public interest issue, the court observed
that gunshot-related crimes imposed substantial social costs on the
community and that public policy, as expressed by courts and
legislatures, provided strong support for reducing these costs by
imposing a duty on handgun manufacturers to market their products
more responsibly.107 Finally, the court declared that the imposition of a
duty to exercise due care in the marketing of its products would not be
unduly burdensome for the defendant and that the costs to society of
imposing such a duty would be slight since this type of weapon had such
low social utility.108 Therefore, the court concluded it should impose a
duty on Navegar to avoid marketing the TEC-DC9 “in such a way as to
increase the inherent risks posed by such a weapon.”109 Unfortunately for
the plaintiffs, the California Supreme Court reversed the intermediate
appellate court, holding that the negligent marketing claim was actually a
product category claim prohibited by state law.110 In addition, the court
concluded that the defendant’s marketing choices did not actually cause
the plaintiffs’ injuries.111
Another form of negligent marketing involves sales campaigns
that are directed at consumers who are likely to harm themselves or
others.112 Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.113 is illustrative. In
Pelman, the plaintiffs alleged that McDonald’s was guilty of targeting
much of its fast food advertising at young children.114 One promotion
104
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featured “a plastic beef steak figure named ‘Slugger’” who was
accompanied by a pamphlet that assured customers that eating two
servings a day from the meat group would help them “climb higher and
ride [their] bike[s] farther.”115 The second promotion featured the
“Mighty Kids Meal,” a beefed-up version of the “Happy Meal.”116 The
plaintiffs contended that the phrase “Mightier Kids Meal” suggested to
children that they would become “mightier” or more grown up if they
consumed large quantities of this product.117
McDonald’s moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court
agreed but granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint.118
The court refused to consider the “Slugger” claim because it had not
been mentioned in the original complaint.119 However, the court declared
that if the plaintiffs cited the “Slugger” example in their amended
complaint, they would have to show that the pamphlet was deceptive and
that they suffered injury as a consequence of this deceptive language.120
The court also rejected the argument that the “Mightier Kids Meal”
promotion constituted improper targeting, concluding instead that it was
merely an example of sales talk or “puffery.”121 The plaintiffs
subsequently filed an amended complaint that dropped the targeting
claim and focused on alleged violations of New York’s Consumer
Protection Act.122 The trial court also dismissed this complaint, but
portions of it were reinstated on appeal.123
Plaintiffs have also brought negligent marketing claims against
manufacturers who targeted unsuitable consumers. For example, the
court in Merrill also found that Navegar directed its advertising and
promotional activities toward a criminal clientele.124 According to the
court, the defendant advertised its firearms in magazines that were aimed
at militarists and survivalists, “such as Soldier of Fortune, SWAT,
Combat Handguns, Guns, Firepower, and Heavy Metal Weapons.”125 In
addition, Navegar highlighted the paramilitary character of its products
in promotional materials that extolled their “military non-glare finish and
combat-type sights.”126 The court also observed that the defendant called
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 543.
119
Id. at 530.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See Richard C. Ausness, Tell Me What You Eat, and I Will Tell You Whom to Sue: Big
Problems Ahead for “Big Food”?, 39 GA. L. REV. 839, 848 (2005).
123
See Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman III), 396 F.3d 508, 512
(2d Cir. 2005).
124
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 156 (Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 28 P.3d 116
(Cal. 2001).
125
Id.
126
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
116

648

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

attention to the fact that its firearms were equipped with combat slings
and threaded barrels and were resistant to fingerprints.127 Finally, the
court noted that Navegar displayed its products at the sort of gun shows
that attracted violence-prone people and provided TEC-DC9s for use in
violence-oriented movies and television shows.128 This was enough for
the court to rule that this form of conduct could constitute negligent
marketing.129
A more common form of negligent marketing involves
distribution practices that facilitate retail sales of a dangerous product to
unsuitable consumers.130 One of the leading cases is Hamilton v. AccuTek,131 where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants shipped large
numbers of firearms to southeastern states, which had relatively weak
gun control regulations, knowing that these products would subsequently
be transported to northeastern states, such as New York, where they
would be sold illegally in black market transactions.132 The lower court
allowed the case to go to trial and the jury found fifteen of the defendants
liable.133 These defendants appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals,134 which certified the following questions to the New York
Court of Appeals: (1) Does New York impose a duty of care on those
who market and distribute firearms? (2) Can damages in negligent
marketing cases involving multiple defendants be apportioned according
to principles of market share liability?135
The New York court discussed the duty issue first, declaring that
gun manufacturers did not owe a general duty of care to society at large;
rather, their liability for negligent marketing had to be based on a
specific duty owed to the injured plaintiff.136 According to the court,
such a duty might arise from a relationship between the defendant and
the plaintiff, as in the case of the duty of care owed by a common carrier
to a passenger, or it might arise from a relationship between the
defendant and the third party tortfeasor, such as employer and employee,
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that enabled the defendant to exercise some control over the acts of the
third party.137
In this case, the court felt that both the connection between
handgun manufacturers and criminals and between manufacturers and
victims of handgun violence was extremely tenuous.138 As the court
pointed out, the typical chain of distribution for firearms would include
the manufacturer, wholesalers and distributors, the first retailer,
subsequent legal purchasers, and ultimately the person who injured the
plaintiff.139 Because of this attenuated connection between the
manufacturer and either the victim or the criminal, the court determined
that it was virtually impossible for the manufacturer to exercise any
control over the conduct of others in the chain of distribution.140
Consequently, the court concluded that it would be inappropriate to
impose a duty on handgun manufacturers to protect victims against
criminal acts by third parties.141 Upon receipt of the New York court’s
answers to these certified questions, the federal Circuit Court ordered the
plaintiffs’ lawsuit to be dismissed.142
In sum, by focusing on the defendant’s marketing practices,
negligent marketing claims provide a way for plaintiffs to avoid
troublesome issues with design defects and inherently dangerous
products. In particular, negligent marketing can be used against
manufacturers who target their products at underage or unsuitable
consumers or who create distribution structures that facilitate illegal sales
of their products at the retail level.
E.

Negligence Per Se

According to the Restatement, “[a]n actor is negligent if, without
excuse, the actor violates a statute that is designed to protect against the
type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.”143 In effect,
a court relies upon the statute to define the applicable standard of care in
a negligence case.144 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant
violated the statute, the court will instruct the jury that the defendant has
137
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failed to exercise the requisite standard of care and the defendant will be
held liable if the plaintiff can prove causation and injury.145 Relying on
the concept of negligence per se, plaintiffs have argued that product
manufacturers who violate FDA regulations should be held liable in tort
for any injuries that are proximately caused by such products, regardless
of whether the products are defective or not. In addition, plaintiffs have
urged courts to treat violations of consumer protection acts as
negligence per se.
1. Violation of FDA Regulations
In Talley v. Danek Medical, Inc.,146 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant obtained FDA approval for its product as a Class II medical
device and then promoted it as a pedicle screw fixation device.147 If the
manufacturer had sought formal FDA approval of the device for use in
pedicle screw fixation procedures, it would have had to secure premarket
approval for the product as a Class III device.148 By seeking FDA
approval of its device for use on long bones and then promoting its offlabel use for back surgery, the defendant avoided having to satisfy the
FDA’s requirements for premarket approval as a Class III device. The
plaintiff in Talley suffered injuries when the defendant’s device was used
in her back surgeries and sued Danek, contending that by deliberately
marketing its product for an unapproved use, the defendant had violated
the FDCA and therefore was negligent as a matter of law.149 The lower
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the
plaintiff appealed.150 On appeal, the court declared that the requirement
that medical devices receive FDA approval before being marketed did
not embody a substantive standard of care.151 Furthermore, the court
determined that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant’s
failure to obtain proper FDA approval had proximately caused her
injuries.152 Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
negligence per se claim.153
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2. Violation of State Consumer Protection Law as Negligence
Per Se
Many states have enacted unfair trade and consumer protection
statutes that are designed to protect consumers against false advertising
and other unethical business practices. Although these statutes are
concerned with fraud against consumers, they are often less restrictive
than common law fraudulent misrepresentation.154 Not surprisingly,
consumers have often attempted to recover for personal injuries against
defendants on the basis of their alleged violations of these statutes. In
some cases, however, these lawsuits have failed because the statutes in
question were only intended to protect against economic losses.155 For
example, in Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc.,156 the plaintiff sued a
promoter of the Atkins Diet, claiming that the low-carbohydrate diet
caused heart problems that required angioplasty.157 The plaintiff
contended that the defendant violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA),158 which prohibited “[u]nfair methods of
competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . . .”159
According to the plaintiff, the defendant violated FDUTPA by:
(1) promoting the Diet and products as safe for all customers “when they well
knew that, for at least a substantial minority of their customers, the [D]iet and
their products carried potential serious risks,” (2) failing to give adequate
warnings about the adverse health consequences of the Diet, and (3) claiming
that the Diet was “fool proof” and a guaranteed success “when they well knew
that there would be people for whom the [D]iet would not be safe.”160

Notwithstanding these allegations, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s
FDUTPA claim must fail because the statute only applied to economic
losses.161
Plaintiffs who have based their claims on violations of consumer
protection statutes have encountered other problems as well. For
example, in LaBelle ex rel. LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc.,162 a federal
district court granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a
claim based on an alleged violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law because the plaintiff was unable
154
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to prove that the deceased smoker relied on any of the defendant’s false
statements about smoking and health.163 Similarly, a claim based on an
alleged violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act failed in
McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P.164 because the plaintiff was unable to
prove causation.165 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s
sales representatives falsely claimed that its product, OxyContin, was
“safer, less addictive, and less prone to abuse than other oxycodonebased pain medications.”166 However, it appeared that the plaintiffs were
already addicted to pain medication long before their physicians first
prescribed OxyContin.167 Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to take
other opioid pain medications at the same time that they were using
OxyContin.168 This caused the court to conclude that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove that OxyContin caused their injuries because there was
“inadequate evidence to differentiate between the plaintiffs’ use of
OxyContin and the other medications taken by them.”169
However, other plaintiffs have achieved some success against
product sellers based on alleged violations of state consumer protection
statutes. For example, in the Pelman case,170 discussed earlier,171 the
parents of two overweight children sued McDonald’s Corporation and
two fast food restaurants, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had
violated sections 349 and 350 of the New York Consumer Protection
From Deceptive Acts and Practices Act (“Consumer Protection Act”).172
Section 349 of the Consumer Protection Act prohibited “[d]eceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service in this state . . . .”173 Section 350 banned “[f]alse
advertising in the conduct of any business.”174 The plaintiffs did not cite
any particular practices or advertisements in their complaint that might
have violated the Consumer Protection Act, but they later identified
statements in McDonald’s advertising campaigns that they claimed were
deceptive.175 One campaign contained the slogans “McChicken
Everyday” and “Big N’ Tasty Everyday,” which suggested that
163
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customers could safely consume McDonald’s fast food products on an
everyday basis.176 In another campaign, the statement, “McDonald’s can
be part of any balanced diet and lifestyle,” appeared on the defendant’s
website.177 In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s failure to
post nutritional information in its restaurants or on its product packaging
was a deceptive practice within the meaning of the Act.178
The trial court rejected all of these arguments. First, it declared
that the exhortation to eat McDonald’s products “everyday” made no
specific health claims and was nothing more than “mere puffery.”179 The
court also determined that the statement on the defendant’s website,
which suggested that moderate consumption of McDonald’s products
could be part of a healthy diet and lifestyle, was not deceptive.180 Finally,
the court concluded that the Consumer Protection Act did not require
McDonald’s to provide nutritional information in its restaurants as long
as this information was otherwise available online.181
The plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint that also
alleged various violations of the Consumer Protection Act.182
Specifically, the amended complaint stated that McDonald’s advertising
misled the plaintiffs by assuring them “that its fast food products were
nutritious” and could be safely consumed on a daily basis.183 The
complaint also claimed that McDonald’s failed to disclose the fact that
its processing methods and use of artificial ingredients resulted in
products that were less healthy than those depicted in its advertising.
Finally, the complaint alleged that the defendant falsely stated that it
provided nutritional information about its products in all of its
restaurants.184 The court agreed that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded
that they had relied on McDonald’s claims about the nutritional content
and healthiness of its food185 but dismissed the complaint again because
the plaintiffs failed to show that consumption of McDonald’s products
was a significant cause of their health problems.186
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
proof of actual reliance was not required to bring a deceptive practices
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claim under section 349 of the Consumer Protection Act.187 However, the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint,
holding that the plaintiffs did not have to provide any specific
information in their complaint alleging that the consumption of
McDonald’s products caused their obesity and resulting health
problems.188 According to the court, information on the causation issue
could best be obtained at a later stage in the proceedings through the
discovery process.189
Although negligence per se may not be a viable theory when it is
based upon alleged violations of FDA regulations, plaintiffs have
successfully invoked it in connection with violations of state consumer
protection laws. Negligence per se is often more advantageous for
plaintiffs than fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment
because consumer protection statutes tend to be broader in scope than
common law fraud doctrines.
III.

ADVANTAGES OF FAULT-BASED LIABILITY THEORIES

At first blush, there would seem to be many disadvantages to
using fault-based liability theories instead of traditional strict liability in
tort. Thus, in theory, it would seem to be much easier to prove that a
product is defective than to prove that the manufacturer or seller failed to
exercise due care. As a matter of fact, one of the early arguments for
strict liability was that it would be more consumer friendly than
negligence.190 To be sure, this was probably true in manufacturing defect
cases, where strict liability relieves the plaintiff of the duty of proving by
expert testimony that the producer’s manufacturing and quality control
processes were negligent. However, many plaintiffs now believe that the
advantages of fault-based liability theories, at least in certain cases,
outweigh their disadvantages. These advantages include avoiding the
Restatement’s requirement that a product be defective, avoiding federal
preemption of certain types of common law tort claims, and enabling
plaintiffs to focus attention on the conduct of the defendant instead of the
condition of the product.
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Avoiding the Defect Requirement

Defectiveness is a core concept in American products liability
law.191 However, the defectiveness requirement may cause difficulties for
some plaintiffs. First of all, it is virtually impossible to prove that
inherently dangerous products are defective under traditional tests for
defectiveness. In addition, juries have trouble understanding the riskutility test in design defect cases. Furthermore, the Products Liability
Restatement’s alternative reasonable design requirement may create
difficulties for plaintiffs in design defect cases. The existence of obvious
hazards is a common pitfall for plaintiffs in failure to warn cases. Finally,
in most states, the standard for defectiveness is narrower for prescription
drugs and medical devices than for other products.
1. Inherently Dangerous Products
Inherently dangerous products are products whose danger cannot
be eliminated without impairing their intended function.192 Neither
section 402A nor the Products Liability Restatement treat inherently
dangerous products as defective, at least when their risks are commonly
known,193 and most courts have followed their lead.194 Consequently,
consumers who cannot satisfy the defect requirement must rely on other
liability theories. Some of these theories have been relatively successful,
particularly when invoked against manufacturers of cigarettes and
handguns. Fraud and civil conspiracy theories have been especially
effective against tobacco companies. For example, in Estate of Schwarz
v. Philip Morris, Inc., an appellate court upheld a jury verdict in favor of
the personal representative of a deceased smoker who alleged that the
defendant cigarette manufacturer had made false statements about the
health risks of smoking.195 Plaintiffs have also used negligent marketing
in order to avoid having to prove defectiveness. In Hamilton v. Accu191
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Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1983).
193
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. c (1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
194
See, e.g., Jeter ex rel. Estate of Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 113 Fed. Appx. 465 (3d Cir. 2004)
(cigarettes); Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman I), 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517-18
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (fast food); LaBelle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517 (D.S.C. 2001)
(cigarettes); Bruner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff’d, 31
Fed. Appx. 932 (11th Cir. 2002) (alcoholic beverages); Little v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480, 491-92 (D.S.C. 2001) (cigarettes); Estate of White ex rel. White v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434 (D. Md. 2000) (cigarettes); Miller v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.
1988); Downs v. R.T.S. Security, Inc., 670 So. 2d 434, 439 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (firearms); Lane v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 853 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Miss. 2003) (cigarettes); Dauphin Deposit Bank
& Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (alcoholic beverages).
195
135 P.3d 409, 423 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
192
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Tek196 and Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.,197 for example,
plaintiffs focused on the marketing practices of handgun and fast food
sellers instead of basing their claims solely on the alleged defectiveness
of their respective products.
2. The Risk-Utility Test and the Reasonable Alternative Design
Requirement
The prevailing test for design defect is known as the risk-utility
test.198 Under this approach, a plaintiff must show that the utility of the
product with a feasible safer alternative design (that is, with an additional
safety feature) outweighs the utility of the product as actually designed.199
The Restatement (Third) has adopted this version of the risk-utility test,
declaring that a design is deemed to be defective if the foreseeable risks
of the product, as designed, “could have been reduced or avoided by . . .
a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”200 Unfortunately, the
risk-utility test is frequently confusing and difficult to apply.201 To make
matters worse, jurors are often hostile to the concept of balancing risks
and benefits.202 Consequently, plaintiffs sometimes prefer to utilize a
fault-based theory that jurors can more easily understand and accept.
The reasonable alternative design requirement also presents
difficulties for plaintiffs in design defect cases. According to the
Products Liability Restatement formulation, a design is considered
defective if the foreseeable risks of the product, as designed, “could have
been reduced or avoided by . . . a reasonable alternative design . . . and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.”203 The Restatement’s requirement of a “reasonable alternative
design” is highly controversial and is not recognized in every state.204
196

62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
264 F.3d 21 (2d. Cir. 2001). For a discussion of Accu-Tek, see supra notes 131-142 and
accompanying text.
197
237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the complaint allegations). For a
discussion of Pelman, see supra notes 113-123, notes 170-188, and accompanying text.
198
See OWEN, supra note 191, § 8.4 at 508.
199
See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978); Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Or. 1978); see also David G. Owen, Toward a Proper
Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1690
(1997).
200
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (b) (1998).
201
See David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 239, 243 (1997).
202
See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547,
563 (2000).
203
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (b) (1998).
204
Compare Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2003)
(requiring a reasonable alternative design); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d
53, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (same), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 201 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2000); Thornton v.
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However, when a court does require proof of an alternative design, this
can seriously compromise a plaintiff’s case.205 For this reason, plaintiffs
may find it advantageous to look for other liability theories in design
defect cases in order to avoid the alternative design requirement.
The Merrill case,206 discussed earlier,207 provides a good example
of this strategy. In Merrill, the plaintiffs objected to various aspects of an
assault weapon’s design.208 If the plaintiffs had sued under a theory of
defective design, they would have had to suggest alternatives to each of
the offending design features. The resulting weapon would have borne
no resemblance to the product that the defendant actually produced, and
it is unlikely that a court would have regarded the plaintiffs’ version of
the defendant’s product as a reasonable alternative design. The plaintiffs
apparently tried to sidestep this problem by formulating their claim as a
negligent marketing claim instead of a design defect claim.209
Interestingly, on appeal, the California Supreme Court saw through the
plaintiffs’ ruse and declared that their negligent marketing case was
really a design defect case in disguise.210
3. Obvious Hazards and the Duty to Warn
Many courts have concluded that product sellers have no duty to
warn consumers about “open and obvious” hazards.211 To avoid the effect
of this rule, plaintiffs have eschewed traditional failure to warn claims
and relied instead on fraudulent misrepresentation or negligent marketing
theories. In a fraudulent misrepresentation case, the issue is whether the
defendant lulled consumers into a false sense of security by falsely
assuring them that a known risk was not as great as they might otherwise
expect. This was the issue in most of the fraudulent misrepresentation
cases brought against the tobacco industry. In these cases, the focus was
not on whether the health risks of smoking were open and obvious, but
Caterpillar, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D.S.C. 1997) (same); Bagley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864
So. 2d 301, 312 (Ala. 2003) (same); Green v. General Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 210 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (same); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 717-18 (R.I. 1999)
(same), with Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997) (rejecting a
reasonable alternative design requirement); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000)
(same); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001) (same);
McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 (Or. 2001) (same).
205
See, e.g., Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1995);
Williams v. Bennett, 921 So. 2d 1269, 1274-77 (Miss. 2006); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d
1269, 1271-72 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1994).
206
89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
207
See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
208
Id. at 154-57.
209
Id. at 162.
210
See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 126 (Cal. 2001).
211
See Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003); Ahrens v. Ford
Motor Co., 340 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Scheibe v. Fort James Corp., 276 F. Supp. 2d 246,
252 (D. Del. 2003); Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 576, 585 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003).
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whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the tobacco companies’
assurances that smoking did not cause lung cancer or other diseases.212
Having vigorously denied that smoking was harmful for almost half a
century, it was difficult for cigarette companies to argue that the hazards
of smoking were matters of common knowledge or that smokers would
not believe the industry’s health claims.213
Another response to the obvious hazard problem is to rely on
negligent marketing instead of failure to warn. Negligent marketing
might be especially effective when the defendant has targeted children or
some other vulnerable group whose knowledge or judgment may not be
as good as that of the general population.214 The tobacco industry’s use of
cartoon characters like “Joe Camel” and other promotional efforts to
encourage underage consumers to smoke is a good example of this type
of negligent marketing.215 There is also evidence that fast food purveyors
have targeted children and teenagers, knowing that they are “notoriously
capricious in their reasoning skills” and “much more likely to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than are adults.”216 In fact,
this very issue arose in the Pelman case.217 The court in Pelman rejected
the plaintiffs’ failure to warn claim, concluding that the health risks of
consuming too much fast food were open and obvious to the general
population.218 However, the plaintiffs in Pelman also alleged that
McDonald’s advertising was targeted at small children.219 The court also
dismissed this claim, but only because the plaintiffs failed to provide any
examples of this type of targeting in their complaint.220 Furthermore, the
court suggested that a targeting claim might be successful if the plaintiffs
referred to specific statements by the defendant and alleged that the
plaintiffs relied upon them.221

212

See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play’s Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud
and Consumer Choice in “Third Wave” Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 494 (1998).
213
Id. at 492. But see Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1293
(Miss. 1995).
214
See Ausness, supra note 91, at 913.
215
See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1481 (1999); Frank J. Vandall,
Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette
Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 419-20 (1991); Erica Sweeker, Note, Joe Camel: Will “Old
Joe” Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1995).
216
See John Alan Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food
Companies, 12 WIDENER L.J. 103, 112 (2003).
217
See supra notes 113-123, 170-189.
218
See Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman I), 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
219
Id. at 530.
220
Id.
221
Id.
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4. Special Rules for Pharmaceutical Products
Pharmaceutical products, such as prescription drugs and medical
devices, received special treatment in section 402A.222 For example, the
drafters of section 402A created an exception to strict liability in
comment k for “[u]navoidably unsafe” but useful products.223
Specifically, comment k provided that the manufacturer of “a product
that is incapable of being made safe for its intended use” would not be
subject to strict liability as long as the utility of the product
“outweigh[ed] its apparent risks and an adequate warning [was]
given.”224 According to comment k, an unavoidably unsafe product was
neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous even though it caused
harm to consumers.225 Almost all courts agreed that comment k exempted
prescription drugs and medical devices from strict liability, provided that
they were properly prepared or manufactured and accompanied by
adequate warnings.226
The Products Liability Restatement also creates a separate, and
more restrictive, liability standard for pharmaceutical products.227
According to the Restatement, a prescription drug or medical device may
be “not reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of
harm . . . are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic
benefits that reasonable health-care providers . . . would not prescribe the
drug or medical device for any class of patients.”228 This standard
protects drug manufacturers against design defect liability, no matter
how dangerous their products may be, as long as they have therapeutic
value for at least one class of users.229
To avoid this limitation on manufacturer liability for prescription
drugs and medical devices, plaintiffs have begun to abandon strict
products liability in favor of fraudulent misrepresentation.230 While many
222

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
Id.
224
See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability:
What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705,
712 (1989-1990).
225
See Marcia Anne Mobilia, Allergic Reactions to Prescription Drugs: A Proposal for
Compensation, 48 ALB. L. REV. 343, 344 (1984).
226
See Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2003); Parkinson v.
Guidant Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744 (W.D. Pa. 2004); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470,
477 (Cal. 1988). But see Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev. 1994); Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984).
227
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (1998); see also James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Essay, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 178
(2001).
228
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
229
See George W. Conk, Essay, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1102 (2000).
230
See, e.g., McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (W.D. Va.
2004) (OxyContin); Berres v. Artifex, Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 909, 916-17 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (bone
screw fixation device); Staudt v. Artifex, Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030-31 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (bone
223
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of these claims have failed because the injured plaintiff could not prove
causation or reliance,231 others have been more successful.232 For
example, in Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.,233 the Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld a fraudulent misrepresentation claim against the
manufacturer of Accutane, an acne medication.234 The plaintiff in
Freeman alleged that the defendant manufacturer falsely represented that
Accutane was safe to use as directed when in fact it knew of the drug’s
danger and “misled the medical community with incomplete and
inaccurate information about the safety of the drug.”235 The plaintiff also
alleged that she had relied on the defendant’s assurances of safety.236 The
court concluded that the plaintiff had stated a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation and reversed the lower court’s dismissal of her suit.237
B.

Avoiding Federal Preemption of Tort Claims

The preemption doctrine, which is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, gives Congress the power to
override state law.238 Courts and commentators traditionally divide
preemption into two basic categories, express and implied, and further
divide implied preemption into field and conflict preemption.239 Express
preemption occurs when a federal statute or administrative regulation
specifically excludes state regulation in a particular area.240 Congress
may also enact a regulatory scheme that is so comprehensive that it
completely “occupies the field” and excludes any form of state

screw fixation device); Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Ct. App. 1990) (heart valve);
Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Cu-7 IUD);
Freeman v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 844-45 (Neb. 2000) (Accutane). Plaintiffs
have tried to base their claims against drug companies on negligent marketing practices. See, e.g.,
Yurcic v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 343 F. Supp. 2d 386, 388 (M.D. Pa. 2004); Little v. Purdue Pharma,
L.P., 227 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141,
143-44 (Ohio 2004).
231
See, e.g., McCauley v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 462 (W.D. Va.
2004) (no causation); Berres v. Artifex, Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (no
reliance); Staudt v. Artifex, Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (no reliance).
232
See, e.g., Khan v. Shiley, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (Ct. App. 1990); Adams v.
G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So. 2d 728, 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Freeman v. HoffmanLaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 844-45 (Neb. 2000).
233
618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
234
Id. at 845.
235
Id. at 844.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 845-46.
238
See Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U.
PITT. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (2004).
239
See M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations,
21 PACE L. REV. 103, 105-10 (2000).
240
See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983); Ry. Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
232 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
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regulation.241 Conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply
with both state and federal law242 or where state law stands as an obstacle
to the achievement of federal regulatory objectives.243
Federal statutes and administrative regulations not only preempt
state statutes and local ordinances, they can also preempt state common
law tort doctrines.244 In recent years, federal preemption has prevented
injured smokers from recovering against cigarette companies who failed
to warn them about the health risks of smoking. The leading case on this
issue is Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.245 In Cipollone, the United States
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that the 1969 Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempted the
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims246 but did not necessarily preempt
claims based on breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, or conspiracy.247 This, in turn, encouraged plaintiffs to
transform their failure to warn claims into fraudulent misrepresentation
or conspiracy claims. Although a few courts have concluded that the
federal cigarette labeling statute preempted fraudulent misrepresentation
claims,248 most determined that such claims were not preempted.249
Good v. Altria Group, Inc.250 is a good example of the majority’s
reasoning. In that case, a group of smokers sued various cigarette
manufacturers, arguing that the manufacturers’ claims that their products
were “light” and had “[l]owered [t]ar and [n]icotine” amounted to
241

See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984).
242
See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133-34 (1913).
243
See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987); Mich. Canners & Freezers
Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984).
244
See generally Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (pacemaker); Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (airbags); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992) (cigarettes).
245
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
246
Id. at 524.
247
Id. at 525-30.
248
See Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir. 2007),
abrogated by Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Clinton v. Brown & Williamson
Holdings, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 639, 651-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re Tobacco Cases II, 163
P.3d 106, 116-17 (Cal. 2007) (preempting statutory claim based on cigarette’s alleged targeting of
underage consumers).
249
See Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d, Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183,
1202 (11th Cir. 2004); Mulford v. Altria Group, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 733, 750-51 (D.N.M. 2007);
Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194, 203 (D. Mass. 2000);
Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (D. Conn. 2000); Whiteley v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 842 (Ct. App. 2004); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848
N.E.2d 1, 33 (Ill. 2005); Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 742 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Minn. Ct. App.
2007); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 604 (App. Div. 1998), aff’d, 720 N.E.2d
892 (N.Y. 1999); Estate of Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 135 P.3d 409, 421 (Or. Ct. App. 2006);
Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 440 (Tex. 1997); see also Rivera v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir 2005) (holding that plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim
was preempted).
250
Good, 501 F.3d 29.
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fraudulent misrepresentations.251 The plaintiffs conceded that the
defendants’ light brands produced lower levels of tar and nicotine in a
FTC-approved test, but alleged that persons who smoked these types of
cigarettes “compensated” by taking longer puffs or smoking more
cigarettes than they would if they smoked “full flavor” brands.252
Consequently, the defendants’ implicit claims about the relative safety of
their products were deceptive.253 The lower court ruled that the plaintiffs’
fraudulent misrepresentation claims were preempted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.254 However, on appeal, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court in Cipollone
had distinguished between failure to warn, concealment, and dilution
claims, which were expressly preempted, and affirmative
misrepresentations of fact, which were not preempted even if they were
concerned with the health effects of smoking.255 Consequently, the court
reversed the lower court and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their
fraudulent misrepresentation claims.256
However, preemption has also caused problems for those who
have been injured by prescription drugs. In such cases, plaintiffs have
tended to rely on both failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims. In the past, a number of courts held that failure to warn claims
based on FDA-approved labeling were impliedly preempted on actual
conflict grounds.257 However, the United States Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Wyeth v. Levine258 has greatly reduced the chances that failure
to warn claims against drug companies will be preempted in the future.
In that case, the plaintiff’s claim was based on an alleged failure to
strengthen an FDA-approved warning in accordance with state law. In
contrast to the courts above, the Supreme Court refused to find that the
state regulation was impliedly preempted and allowed the plaintiff’s
claim.259 On the other hand, the status of fraudulent misrepresentation in
this area is somewhat unclear. So far, several courts have already held
251

Id. at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 30-31.
253
Id. at 31.
254
See Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 153 (D. Me. 2006).
255
Good, 501 F.3d at 39-44.
256
Id. at 58-59. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will rule on the preemption
issue in 2009. See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008).
257
See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, No.
08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9. 2009); Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 541 F.
Supp. 2d 768, 782 (W.D.N.C. 2008); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287-89 (W.D.
Okla. 2008); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 317 (E.D. Pa. 2007). But see In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 788 (E.D. La. 2007); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Fujisawa Phar. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666,
674 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 2006);
Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D. Neb. 2006); McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc.,
949 A.2d 223, 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), cert. granted in part and denied in part, 960
A.2d 393 (N.J. 2008).
258
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
259
Id. at 1204.
252
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that fraudulent misrepresentation claims based on FDA-approved
labeling are impliedly preempted,260 although in an unreported New York
trial court decision, one court has concluded that they are not.261 In this
latter case, Smith v. Johnson & Johnson Co., the court refused to grant a
summary judgment motion by the defendant, the manufacturer of
Propulsid, a drug used in the treatment of diabetes.262 The plaintiff set
forth a number of allegations against the defendant, including fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment, in connection with the risks of
Propulsid use.263 The court declared that it agreed with the federal district
court’s decision in Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Laboratories,264 which
held that Congress did not intend for federal prescription drug
regulations to preempt state tort law claims.265
C.

Playing the “Blame Game”

Another advantage of fault-based theories is that they enable
plaintiffs’ lawyers to use the “hot” rhetoric of fault instead of the “cold”
rhetoric of strict liability.266 In addition, these theories reinforce claims
for punitive damages.
Despite the fact that strict products liability was developed to
make it easier for consumers to recover for their injuries, many lawyers
prefer to rely on negligence instead of strict liability.267 As Paul
Rheingold pointed out more than thirty years ago, “negligence is ‘hot’
and strict liability is ‘cold.’”268 In other words, it was easier for a plaintiff
to persuade jurors that the defendant did something wrong than it was to
convince them that the product in question was defective in some way.269
Other commentators have agreed with this observation.270 This may
explain why fault-based liability theories, like negligent entrustment,
negligent marketing, and negligence per se, are popular with plaintiffs’
lawyers. If jurors respond positively to fault-based claims against product
sellers, one would expect them to be even more receptive to liability
260

See Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775, 782-83
(W.D.N.C. 2008); Colacicco 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525, 549.
261
See Smith v. Johnson & Johnson Co., No. 108901/01, 2004 WL 2964419 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2004).
262
Id. at *1.
263
Id. at *2.
264
695 F. Supp. 700, 710-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 182 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1992).
265
Johnson & Johnson, 2004 WL 2964419, at *7.
266
See infra text accompanying note 268.
267
See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability
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theories, like fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment,
which involve serious wrongdoing. What jury could resist doing its part
to ensure that good triumphs over evil? The moral high ground for
plaintiffs is even greater when the several defendants conspire together to
behave badly. Hence, the popularity of civil conspiracy claims.
Sadly, examples of blameworthy behavior on the part of product
manufacturers are not hard to find. For example, the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield IUD marketed its product without conducting adequate
testing and ignored reports of septic abortions and other injuries that
were caused by its intrauterine device.271 Asbestos litigation revealed that
asbestos manufacturers not only failed to disclose health risks associated
with exposure to asbestos insulation products, but conspired to prevent
information about these risks obtained by third parties from reaching
workers, consumers, or the general public.272 Even more shocking was
the forty-year campaign by the tobacco industry to conceal the health
risks of smoking from the medical community and the public. Beginning
in 1953, tobacco companies, either individually or through industry trade
associations, allegedly issued misleading press releases, disseminated
false information in articles, destroyed or concealed evidence about the
health risks of smoking, denied that nicotine was addictive, and targeted
their advertising at underage consumers.273 It is also claimed that tobacco
companies manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes to keep smokers
addicted to their products.274
More recently, manufacturers of lead paint and their trade
associations have been accused of conspiring to suppress information
about the health risks of exposure to lead-based paint.275 The marketing
practices of handgun manufacturers,276 pharmaceutical companies,277 and
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fast food purveyors278 have come under fire as well. Therefore, it is not
surprising that plaintiffs have been quick to discover the benefits of
bringing fault-based claims against product manufacturers in lieu of
those based on conventional strict liability theory in instances, such as
those discussed above, where product sellers appear to have engaged in
flagrant misconduct.
In addition, focusing on the defendant’s misconduct also directs
attention away from the role that the plaintiff or others may have played
in causing the plaintiff’s injury. This is illustrated by the history of
tobacco litigation. In the early decades of this litigation, tobacco
companies were able to persuade juries that smokers freely chose to
smoke and were, therefore, responsible for their injuries.279 However,
juries later began to sympathize more with smokers after they presented
evidence of fraud and other misconduct by the tobacco industry.280 A
similar result may eventually occur in fast food cases if plaintiffs
continue to emphasize the questionable marketing practices of fast food
companies.
Furthermore, basing claims for compensatory damages on faultbased liability theories may increase a plaintiff’s chances of obtaining a
generous punitive damage award. Punitive or exemplary damages
constitute an award to an injured party in addition to that which is
necessary to compensate for his or her actual loss.281 The principal
objectives of punitive damages are “(1) to punish the defendant for
outrageous misconduct and (2) to deter the defendant and others from
similarly misbehaving in the future.”282 However, in traditional products
liability litigation, liability for compensatory damages is determined on a
strict liability basis, while punitive damages are awarded on the basis of
fault. Consequently, when the compensatory damage claim is fault-
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based, the plaintiff may be able to support both damage claims with the
same fault-based narrative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has examined some of the liability theories that
plaintiffs have used to supplement or to substitute for more conventional
strict liability claims in products liability cases. They include fraudulent
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy,
negligent entrustment, negligent marketing, and negligence per se.
Plaintiffs find these fault-based theories appealing because they allow
them to avoid some of the doctrinal limitations and proof problems
associated with strict liability. These theories are more likely to resonate
with juries than the efficiency-based approach that defines strict products
liability. Consequently, plaintiffs will almost certainly continue to use
these fault-based theories in the future.
However, this increased reliance on alternative liability theories
raises a number of concerns. The first is whether it is appropriate for
juries to take account of the defendant’s conduct when deciding product
liability cases. The injection of fault-based liability theories would seem
to threaten the doctrinal integrity of products liability law, which has
traditionally been based on strict liability. Arguably, a liability regime
that rests on two antithetical principles—fault and no fault—will not be
able to retain its doctrinal integrity for long. In response, it must be
acknowledged that conduct already plays an important role in products
liability. For example, affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk,
and, more recently, comparative fault, can reduce damage awards to
victims in strict liability cases, or even prevent them from recovering any
damages at all. In addition, jurors often focus on the defendant’s conduct
now that punitive damages have become an integral part of products
liability law. Moreover, the Products Liability Restatement itself has
incorporated negligence principles into its definition of design defects
and inadequate warnings.283 With a number of fault-based principles
already fully incorporated into modern products liability law, it is
probably too late to worry about doctrinal coherence.
Another concern is whether incorporating fault-based liability
doctrines into products liability law might result in excessive liability for
product sellers. Some of these theories, such as fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, civil conspiracy, and
negligence per se, are established doctrines with clear requirements that
plaintiffs must satisfy in order to recover. As such, they are limited in
scope and therefore do not present much risk of excessive liability in
their present form. On the other hand, newer, undeveloped doctrines, like
negligent marketing, pose a greater risk to product sellers if they are
283
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expanded to impose new obligations or restrictions on marketing
practices. There is also a risk that plaintiffs will use fault-based theories
in order to demonize unpopular defendants like tobacco companies or
handgun manufacturers and thus increase the chances of large damage
awards awarded by outraged juries. Another link between fault-based
liability theories and the risk of excessive liability is that these theories
may unfairly prejudice defendants when plaintiffs seek punitive
damages.
To conclude, it appears that fault-based liability theories are here
to stay and may ultimately be good for products liability law. However,
courts should be cautious about embracing novel or expansive versions
of these theories, especially when they are accompanied by claims for
punitive damages.

